### 2AC Financial Incentives

#### We meet: PCI is a financial incentive- direct payment or PTC

Rosner and Goldberg 2011 (Robert Rosner, astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, and Stephen Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.”, Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011)

Production Cost Incentive: A production cost incentive is a performance-based incentive. With a production cost incentive, the government incentive would be triggered only when the project successfully operates. The project sponsors would assume full responsibility for the upfront capital cost and would assume the full risk for project construction. The production cost incentive would establish a target price, a so-called “market-based benchmark.” Any savings in energy generation costs over the target price would accrue to the generator. Thus, a production cost incentive would provide a strong motivation for cost control and learning improvements, since any gains greater than target levels would enhance project net cash flow. Initial SMR deployments, without the benefits of learning, will have significantly higher costs than fully commercialized SMR plants and thus would benefit from production cost incentives. Because any production cost differential would decline rapidly due to the combined effect of module manufacturing rates and learning experience, the financial incentive could be set at a declining rate, and the level would be determined on a plant-by-plant basis, based on the¶ achievement of cost reduction targets.43 The key design parameters for the incentive include the following:¶ 1. The magnitude of the deployment incentive should decline with the number of SMR modules and should phase out after the fleet of LEAD and FOAK plants has been deployed.¶ 2. The incentive should be market-based rather than cost-based; the incentive should take into account not only the cost of SMRs but also the cost of competing technologies and be set accordingly.¶ 3. The deployment incentive could take several forms, including a direct payment to offset a portion of production costs or a production tax credit.

#### Counter-interpretation: Financial incentives are grants loans and tax incentives

BASE No Date (Business Alliance for Sustainable Energy, 3EStrategies, “A Guide to U.S. Federal, Oregon, and Local Financial Incentives Available to Firms Engaged in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency,” <http://www.3estrategies.org/Documents/IncentivesforSEcompaniesguide--3-06_000.pdf>)

U.S. FEDERAL LEVEL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES. Assistance is available in the following forms: grants, loans (typically, loan guarantees), and tax incentives (in the form of tax credits or special tax deductions). The government also buys goods and services through procurement contracts. In the renewable energy/energy field, the federal departments or agencies most frequently involved include: the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The federal government also makes funds available to state governments; see the “state-level incentives” section of this guide for further information.

#### We meet “reduce restrictions”: Financial viability is a restriction on nuclear production

Ward 2009 (Tony Ward, Partner at Ernst & Young Law Firm, “Regional opportunities in the nuclear renaissance,” World Nuclear, http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2009/papers/ward.pdf)

Nuclear power generation is once more judged to be a credible option as the world seeks to respond to the challenge of meeting its growing energy needs. As a result, the nuclear power industry is experiencing its biggest surge of interest and activity for 25 years. More than 30 countries have announced proposals to pursue new nuclear build as part of their future energy strategy, and the number is growing steadily. More than 10 countries have reactors under active construction.¶ Ernst & Young estimate that expected future global nuclear capacity could be in excess of 397 GW. By comparison current capacity is 347 GW.¶ So which regions are attractive for investment in nuclear power? How can opportunities in different countries be assessed? And what are the implications for the industry?¶ To answer these questions, Ernst & Young has developed a positioning map of 21 countries with potential for nuclear power, which identifies five clusters sharing similar drivers. This analysis gives investors an opportunity to assess the relative strengths of one country against another and to focus on the relevant issues within each group.¶ We believe that the recession will prove to be less of a constraining factor on new nuclear builds than the ability of governments and regulators to build a framework that is attractive to investors. Ultimately, countries will take decisions to allow new nuclear and firm orders will begin to appear; at that point, supply chain constraints will emerge and the race will be on to complete construction by 2020. Those hoping to join the ranks of nuclear countries must do all they can to address any outstanding issues and attract investment in time.¶ Country attractiveness¶ We evaluated the issues of primary concern to technology vendors, construction groups and utilities to identify the leading factors linked to a national market’s attractiveness for new nuclear investment. These were:¶ • Scale of opportunity. Markets offering the potential for multiple reactors were judged more attractive than single-unit opportunities, reflecting transaction costs and also the upfront costs of securing regulatory approvals. In the analysis, we selected those countries with realistic programs capable of commencing construction within the coming decade, given the nature of supply chain constraints.¶ • Government support and regulatory capacity. There is a strongly perceived advantage to doing business in countries with an established nuclear capability, regulatory and wider commercial infrastructure. It is this variable that often decides the relative position of one opportunity over another.¶ • Market and investment framework. Poor access to finance or an inability for international investors to enter a market has restricted some markets’ attractiveness, even though significant opportunities existed. In some cases, delays in planning processes were welcomed by vendors, in the hope that economic conditions will have improved by the time financing is required.

#### “And/or” means one or the other or both

Words and Phrases 2007 Words & Phrases: Permanent Edition, 2007, vol 3A, p.220

C.A.1 (Mass.) 1981. Words "and/or," for contract purposes, commonly mean the one or the other or both.—Local Division 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Com. of Mass., 666 F.2d 618, certiorari denied Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 102 S.Ct. 2928, 457 U.S. 1117, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329.— Contracts 159.

### case

#### skilled employment and manufacturing key

Lazear 2012 (Edward P. Lazear, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 2006-2009, professor at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business and a Hoover Institution fellow, April 2, 2012, “The Worst Economic Recovery in History,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.html)

How many times have we heard that this was the worst recession since the Great Depression? That may be true—although the double-dip recession of the early 1980s was about comparable. Less publicized is that our current recovery pales in comparison with most other recoveries, including the one following the Great Depression.¶ The Great Depression started with major economic contractions in 1930, '31, '32 and '33. In the three following years, the economy rebounded strongly with growth rates of 11%, 9% and 13%, respectively.¶ The current recovery began in the second half of 2009, but economic growth has been weak. Growth in 2010 was 3% and in 2011 it was 1.7%. Who knows what 2012 will bring, but the current growth rate looks to be about 2%, according to the consensus of economists recently polled by Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Sadly, we have never really recovered from the recession. The economy has not even returned to its long-term growth rate and is certainly not making up for lost ground. No doubt, there are favorable economic numbers to be found, but overall we continue to struggle.¶ During the postwar period up to the current recession (1947-2007), the average annual growth rate for the U.S. was 3.4%. The last three decades have experienced somewhat slower growth than the earlier periods, but even in the period 1977-2007, the average growth rate was 3%. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recovery began in the second half of 2009. Since that time, the economy has grown at 2.4%, below our long-term trend by either measure. At this point, the economy is 12% smaller than it would have been had we stayed on trend growth since 2007.¶ Worse, the gap is growing over time. Today, the economy is four percentage points further from the trend line than it was the first quarter of 2009 when this administration's nearly $900 billion fiscal stimulus efforts began. If forecasts of around 2% growth turn out to be accurate, we will add to that gap this year.¶ Contrast this weak growth with the recovery that followed the other large recession of recent decades. In the early 1980s, the economy experienced a double-dip recession, with contractions in both 1980 and '82. But growth rates in the subsequent two years averaged almost 6%. The high growth that persisted throughout the 1980s brought the economy quickly back to the trend line. Unlike the current period, from 1983 on, the economy was in rapid catch-up mode and eventually regained all that had been lost during the early '80s.¶ Indeed, that was the expectation. As economist Victor Zarnowitz of the University of Chicago argued many years ago, the strength of the recovery is related to the depth of the recession. Big recessions are followed by robust recoveries, presumably because more idle resources are available to be tapped. Unfortunately, the current post-recession period has not followed the pattern.¶ The 2007-09 recession was induced by a financial crisis and some, most notably economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (authors of "This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly"), argue that financial crises pose more difficult recovery problems than do policy-induced recessions.¶ The early '80s recession could be viewed as induced by the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy (i.e., raising interest rates), which was designed to rein in inflation. Growth returns more rapidly, they argue, when the policy hindering it changes (i.e., the Fed lowers interest rates) than when the economy is struggling after a severe credit crisis like the one we experienced after the 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns.¶ But some, Stanford economist John Taylor being their leading spokesman, argue that the current recession was caused by Fed policy as well—rates remained too low for too long in the lead up to the subprime mortgage fiasco. The Great Depression also began with a financial crisis but saw high growth rates following contractionary years, and the output lost in negative years was eventually regained through higher subsequent growth.¶ Are there other factors that may have contributed to the slow recovery that we are experiencing? It would be difficult to argue that government polices over the past three years have enhanced confidence in the U.S. business environment. Threats of higher taxes, the constantly increasing regulatory burden, the failure to pursue an aggressive trade policy that will open markets to U.S. exports, and the enormous increase in government spending all are growth impediments. Policies have focused on short-run changes and gimmicks—recall cash for clunkers and first-time home buyer credits—rather than on creating conditions that are favorable to investment that raise productivity and wages.¶ There are some positive developments. The labor market is improving, albeit slowly. Profits remain high and the stock market has enjoyed some recent success. We can hope that these indicate better times and higher growth ahead. But unless we move to a set of economic policies that are aimed at growing the economy rather than at promoting social agendas, this may be the first "recovery" in history that fails to see us return to long-term average growth.

#### Other countries looking to SMRs

Taso 2011 (Firas Eugen Taso, masters thesis for double MA in Urban and Environmental Policy Planning and Law and Diplomacy from Tufts, May 2011, “21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors,” online)

There are currently of two types of SMRs: first-to market LWR reactors with a timeframe of coming online of five to 10 years, or advanced, non-LWR designs which have a longer timeframe of coming to market of 10-25+ years.163 None are currently licensed, though applications are currently being discussed and, in the case of some reactors, are close to being filed with the NRC, as Mike Snodderly mentions. Others are looking at SMRs as well. Russia, for example, has explored SMRs on ice-breakers in the Baltic for decades, and has a unit, the Akademik Lomonosov which has already been launched in 2010 with anticipated deployment after commissioning by 2012, and others in the works.164 China, India and South Korea are also looking at the technology not only for domestic use, but for international exports and building a new industry market.165 For example, China has already exported small and medium power reactors. In 1991, China began building a reactor in Pakistan and started constructing a second reactor there in 2005.166 While the French and the Japanese are still not committed to SMRs, the interest in SMRs is growing around the world, some of the technology is rather familiar and some argue trusted, and the future of the nuclear industry may be influenced by these reactors.167

### Preds/compl

#### Managerialism key to avert nuclear conflict that would preclude solvency for the alt

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm Gwynne **Dyer** December 30, 200**4** is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 papers worldwide. This is an abridged version of the last chapter in his updated book, War, first published in 1985. His latest book is Future: Tense. The Coming Global Order, published by McClelland and Stewart. by the Toronto Star The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village by Gwynne Dyer

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad — by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities — that the victors made a second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveler: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here." But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighboring states have lived in a perpetual state of potential war, just as neighboring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The good news for humans is that it looks like peaceful conditions, once established, can be maintained. And if baboons can do it, why not us? The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substantial progress. We have not had World War III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time — Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars, mostly — seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side. If you assessed the progress that has been made since 1945 from the perspective of that terrifying time, the glass would look at least half-full. The enormous growth of international organizations since 1945, and especially the survival of the United Nations as a permanent forum where the states of the world are committed to avoiding war (and often succeed), has already created a context new to history. The present political fragmentation of the world into more than 150 stubbornly independent territorial units will doubtless persist for a good while to come. But it is already becoming an anachronism, for, in every other context, from commerce, technology, and the mass media to fashions in ideology, music, and marriage, the outlines of a single global culture (with wide local variations) are visibly taking shape. It is very likely that we began our career as a rising young species by exterminating our nearest relatives, the Neanderthals, and it is entirely possible we will end it by exterminating ourselves, but the fact that we have always had war as part of our culture does not mean that we are doomed always to fight wars. Other aspects of our behavioral repertoire are a good deal more encouraging. There is, for example, a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history, we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category of people (our lot) whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we quarrel. Over the past 15,000 or 20,000 years we have successively widened this category from the original hunting-and-gathering band to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the state, where we recognize our shared interests with millions of people whom we don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race. There was nothing in the least idealistic or sentimental in any of the previous redefinitions. They occurred because they were useful in advancing people's material interests and ensuring their survival. The same is true for this final act of redefinition: We have reached a point where our moral imagination must expand again to embrace the whole of mankind. It's no coincidence that the period in which the concept of the national state is finally coming under challenge by a wider definition of humanity is also the period that has seen history's most catastrophic wars, for they provide the practical incentive for change. But the transition to a different system is a risky business: The danger of another world war which would cut the whole process short is tiny in any given year, but cumulatively, given how long the process of change will take, it is extreme. That is no reason not to keep trying. Our task over the next few generations is to transform the world of independent states in which we live into some sort of genuine international community. If we succeed in creating that community, however quarrelsome, discontented, and full of injustice it will probably be, then we shall effectively have abolished the ancient institution of warfare. Good riddance.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys the discipline

Wendt**,** Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### Even if there is no absolute truth, we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 *International Relations and the “Third Debate,”* ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Even if things are uncertain- we must act to deal with existential threats

Richard Allen Posner (born January 11, 1939) is an American jurist, legal theorist, and economist who is currently a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is an influential figure in the law and economics school of thought. 2004 CATASTROPHE RISK AND RESPONSE

The point about catastrophic risk as political litmus paper is not limited to global warming. It is general, reflecting the scientific illiteracy of most nonscientists. The nonscientist, not being in a position to evaluate the significance of scientific disagreement, will unless there is unanimity of scientific opinion be sorely tempted to adopt the scientific position that fits his own political outlook. So liberals oppose the ABM defense and controls on biotechnology, and conservatives oppose taxes on carbon dioxide emissions and measures to preserve genetic diversity. The scientific ignorance not of the public at large, but of the people who count in making and implementing policy, is perhaps remediable. More stubborn are the obstacles that interest-group politics, as illuminated by the theory of public choice, and politics more broadly, strew in the path of responding to the catastrophic risks. Perhaps the greatest of these obstacles is that politicians are unlikely to earn any gratitude from the electorate for minimizing risks that are unlikely in any event to occur, no matter how great the consequences if they do occur, when to deal with such risks a politician might have to forgo responding to risks of losses that, though much smaller, are also much more likely to occur before the politician leaves office. The person who wants his health insurance restored is unlikely to be impressed by being told that the government has decided that an asteroid defense is a more urgent priority than universal health insurance. The critical analytical technique for evaluating and ameliorating the catastrophic risks is cost-benefit analysis. It remains a usable tool despite the pervasive uncertainties, ethical and conceptual as well as factual, concerning those risks—that is one of the most important points that I have tried to make in this book. But cost-benefit analysis of catastrophic risks must be enriched with recognition of the cognitive difficulty that people encounter in dealing with very small probabilities and very large magnitudes. And the uncertainties arising from the peculiar character of the catastrophic risks create an inescapable need for value judgments concerning such matters as the proper weight to be given the interests of remote future generations, the nonmonetizable social benefits to be ascribed to basic scientific research, and the degree of risk aversion appropriate in responding to the catastrophic risks. Bridging the gap between a purely economic analysis of these responses and the ultimate decision that answers the question "what is to be done?" is another project in which properly informed lawyers can play a critical role. But emphasis must fall on "properly informed," as yet merely an aspiration. A final point is that cost-benefit analysis should not be thought of as purely normative or public-choice theory as purely positive. The political process may not be dominated by costs and benefits, but it is influenced by them. Inverse cost-benefit analysis, in which the expected costs of a disaster are divided by the current government expenditures on preventing the disaster from occurring to yield the probability of disaster implied by the expenditures, can be a wake-up call for politicians and the public. We have seen that the levels of current expenditure to combat the major catastrophic risks, even bioterrorism, the one that has managed to thrust itself into the public consciousness, assume that the risks are much smaller than they probably are. We have also seen that there are many possibilities, ranging from detection and interception systems for averting asteroid collisions to additional police measures for averting bioterror attacks, for responding to the catastrophic risks without breaking the bank. Were the dangers posed by the catastrophic risks and the opportunities for minimizing those dangers at reasonable cost more generally recognized, the United States and the world would rouse themselves to effective action, and the world would be a safer place.

#### focus on basis of knowledge precludes ability to respond to global threats—education should priroritize

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 2003 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

#### Calls to address specific security threats are key to solve those problems without succumbing to the pratfalls of the Bush Doctrine

Kailyn Nicholson and Anna Schaffer - Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies - 3/10/2011, The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion: Strategies for a Sustainable Fourth Wave of Democratization, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/16487/Task%20Force%20C%202011%20Web.pdf?sequence=1

Democracy Promotion in Rhetoric The current administration has attempted to steer clear of unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic doctrine. This resolution appears to reflect the Obama administration‘s efforts to disassociate from the Bush-era rhetoric that provoked such global criticism. Post 9/11, the Bush administration was seen to sway between a preemptive realism that sought to unilaterally maintain America‘s position of power in the world and a lofty Wilsonian rhetoric that espoused spreading democratic ideals to all corners of the globe. Especially under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, supporting democracy and the promotion of freedom was embraced as a foreign policy goal. The Freedom Agenda incorporated or helped to justify the global war on terror and Iraqi invasion. Increasingly weak evidence to support initial justifications for intervention eventually gave way to the language of democracy promotion as a more appealing rhetoric. And, Iraq became the centerpiece of this agenda executed in the name of promoting democratic values and supporting human rights. In his second inaugural address in 2005, former President Bush stated, So it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world…We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require decent treatment of their own people. America‘s belief in human dignity will guide our principles (Bush 2005) In claiming that the long-term goal of the U.S. was to end ‗tyranny in our world,‘ Bush set unrealistic and idealized expectations for the results of democracy promotion. Much of the justifications by the Bush administration for democracy promotion asserted the moral grounds for democracy. In a speech at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt, former President Bush pronounced: Some say any state that holds an election is a democracy. But true democracy requires vigorous political parties allowed to engage in free and lively debate. True democracy requires the establishment of civic institutions that ensure an election‘s legitimacy and hold leaders accountable. And true democracy requires competitive elections in which opposition candidates are allowed to campaign without fear or intimidation. Too often in the Middle East, politics has consisted of one leader and the opposition in jail. America is deeply concerned about the plight of political prisoners in this region, as well as democratic activists who are intimidated or repressed, newspapers and civil society organizations that are shut down, and dissidents whose voices are stifled. The time has come for nations across the Middle East to abandon these practices, and treat their people with dignity and the respect they deserve (Bush 2008) Here, former President Bush professed to stand behind democratic forces in all states. The fact that this speech took place three years after the 2005 Egyptian presidential election, where one candidate, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned, highlights a thread of hypocrisy in Bush‘s lofty rhetoric. Alternatively, the Obama administration adopted a more realistic rhetoric that gave recognition to other national interests, including security interests and threats to U.S. security. In response to the discourse and policies of the previous administration President Obama stated: Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power -- including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America's example -- to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that's based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes -- a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world (Obama 2010) Indeed, Obama‘s rhetoric implies a much more pragmatic approach than that of the previous administration. Here, Obama stated the need for balancing various U.S. interests and real-world threats, while also acknowledging tensions. One critique of Obama states, ―If there is an Obama doctrine emerging, it is one much more realpolitik than his predecessor‘s, focused on relations with traditional great powers and relegating issues like human rights and democracy to second-tier concerns‖ (Baker 2010). However, it should be noted and taken into consideration that pragmatic responses advocated by the Obama administration may have been influenced by the legacy issues left from the previous administration. It is possible the Obama administration has taken a realistic and pragmatic approach because it is an alternative to the last administration. Therefore, it is important to consider how foreign policy is influenced by legacy and also how it may be constrained by reality. In any case, within any administration, Wilsonian ideals and moral values are never to be ignored. In his most recent State of the Union address Obama gave support to human rights and noted: Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose behind it. In south Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war….And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The U.S. of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people (Obama 2011) While Obama does still express support for human rights and democratic values he does so with an air of caution. Unlike the previous administration, this administration refrains from soaring unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic and realistic rhetoric regarding foreign policy and democracy promotion. In doing so, this current administration is seen to be noticeably less hypocritical and inconsistent than the previous. C. Implementation: Rhetoric in Action? In reality U.S. democracy promotion efforts have not reflected the rhetoric surrounding it. Democracy promotion is inconsistent country to country and policy to policy. Actions do not reflect the language expressed by policy makers to support democracy. After the Bush administration it has become increasingly entangled with military interests resulting in the association of democracy promotion with regime change and forceful coercion. Under the façade of democracy promotion, policies may implement a top-down effort supporting supposed democratic leaders rather than fostering democratic values from the bottom-up through civil society. Its exclusiveness and selectiveness is seen when we support democracy in one state and ignore human rights in another. Within the Bush administration a large gap existed between talk and action whether it was the continued cozy relations with the Saudi government, the U.S. embrace of Pakistan‘s former military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or the largely uncritical line toward China‘s continued authoritarianism (Carothers 2007). In the Middle East, the Bush administration later came to characterize its interventionin Iraq as a democratizing mission, when clearly other interests, particularly security interests were involved from the start. Other U.S. autocratic allies in the region felt almost no pressure at all, despite the Bush team‘s grand pronouncements about its commitment to a politically transformed region (Carothers 2007). Instead, the Bush administration worked to tighten relations with allies in the region in an effort to create a friendly coalition of states that would serve as useful partners in the War on Terror and would help to maintain the balance of power as it was in the Middle East. Thus, the statement of principles made by President Bush at the World Economic Forum in Egypt in 2008 rarely applies to Egypt or other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia have all escaped the rhetoric of supporting human rights and democratic values by the Bush administration(Carothers 2007). Indeed, inconsistency between rhetoric and action is widespread; however, inconsistency in rhetoric between private and public audiences also exists. This is a different situation where the U.S. presents public rhetoric of support, for example, in the case of Egypt -prior to the year 2011- but expresses disapproval and criticisms in private. The recent release of WikiLeaks documents has revealed how American diplomats have repeatedly raised concerns with Egyptian officials about jailed dissidents and bloggers. A 2009 cable from U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, highlighted the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state that is both a strategic ally, but also a partial democracy ruled by an oppressive president: We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE [Government of Egypt] remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament (Embassy Cairo. 2009) However, the documents also show that relations between Mubarak and Obama warmed up as a result of Obama playing down what was the so-called ‗name and shame‘ approach of the Bush Administration (Landler and Lehren 2011). The nature of the WikiLeaks documents concerning Egypt draw attention to a balancing of private pressure with strong public support for Mubarak under the current administration-underscoring yet another sign of inconsistency. II. How False U.S. Rhetoric Has Hurt U.S. Reputation and Image While the U.S. has unparalleled economic and military assets, American influence and standing in the world are significantly low. Frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals have harmed the U.S. image as an international power and moral figure. This negative image is partially a consequence of false rhetoric. A recent committee on human rights in Washington acknowledged, ―The world is not blind to this double standard. When they see the U.S. promoting human rights, not as a matter of principle but as a matter of convenience, it saps these principles of much of their force, and it makes the U.S. a much less powerful moral force on behalf of the values that this Nation stands for‖ (U.S. 2008). Even among other Western nations, the U.S. is seen to have a weak stance concerning human rights. In 1998, The United States Information Agency (USIA) found that 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said the U.S. was doing a good job promoting human rights. Today, 56 percent of the British and 78 percent of Germans say the US is doing a bad job (Kull 2007). Clearly, opinions of the U.S. on human rights issues have degraded significantly. An American rhetoric supporting human rights and democratic ideals worldwide while, simultaneously, failing to be consistent in implementing this rhetoric evidently will influence this degradation. The U.S. is viewed as hypocritical in its rhetoric about human rights and democracy because it is seen to be selective in its actual application. American leaders pursue more confrontational strategies for supporting democratic change against those countries with strained relations with the U.S. and adopt policies of engagement to induce or, at times, overlook democratic change with allies and friends. ―Close American relationships with authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and cordial relationships with autocratic rulers in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Equatorial Guinea, undermine U.S. credibility when criticizing similar types of autocratic regimes with less friendly ties to Washington‖ (McFaul 2010,163). Rhetoric about liberty has been juxtaposed with the instability in Iraq and democracy promotion has become associated with regime change. In the past decade, ―the rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad‖ (Melia 2007, 12). Public opinion polls from a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center found the U.S. to be broadly disliked in most countries surveyed. Furthermore, a degrading trend in U.S. image can be seen as a repercussion of the inconsistency in rhetoric and policy of the past. A poll, conducted for BBC World Service in 18 countries, tracked this issue from 2005-2007. ―On average, positive views of the U.S. have slipped from 40 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2007. Negative views have risen from 46 percent in 2005 to 52 percent in 2007‖ (Kull 2007). What‘s more, Gallup Polls in 143 countries reveal the image of the leadership of the U.S. is generally poor worldwide, but that the Obama administration will have the most repair work to do on its image in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa, where regional median approval is just 15 percent (Ray 2009). One year into his term, global opinion polls taken by Gallup reflect a positive view of Obama‘s leadership and foreign policy, yet, still present mixed reviews towards his handlings of trouble spots in the Middle East (English 2010). Such negative views of the U.S. erode U.S. power and undermine U.S. influence abroad. III. Democracy Promotion as a Façade for Promoting Other U.S. Interests The point where democracy promotion rhetoric does not properly align with implementation of supporting democracy, in any given state, is a sign of inconsistency and the use of democracy promotion as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests. Inconsistency between rhetoric and action in democracy promotion highlights the varying and diverse interests of the U.S. where democracy promotion, at times, wrongly serves the purpose of justifying other non-related and sometimes contrary U.S. interests. While the U.S. does wish to support and uphold human rights and the universal concept of economic, social and political freedoms, these interests somehow fall behind other US interests. This raises the questions of: whether U.S. interests are presented as prioritized? And how does one account for the supremacy of security interests over values of supporting human rights and democracy in general? This section will first examine U.S. interests from a Wilsonian, idealist view and next, from a realist view. These two schools of thought concerning foreign policy and inevitably, democracy promotion are today seen to be in opposition with each other. This can be accounted for by the short-term mindset of foreign policy in any given administration. Foreign policy is bound to vary with each new administration, within the same administration or due to a change in the global landscape. A forward-looking foreign policy strategy encourages a balance between interests of supporting human rights and moral values (so called idealist interests), and realist tendencies to focus solely on security and strategic interests. The current strategy, however, juxtaposes these two interest views and prompts a choice between the two. Thus, while it is in U.S. interests in the long-term to promote democracy as an end in itself, U.S. actions concerning democracy promotion currently seem to be motivated and driven by short-term interests. This section will analyze where focus on short-term realist interests has prompted a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. In this manner, democracy promotion is used as a tool, rather than an end, to maintain or secure other strategic interests. What‘s more, efforts to advance democracy and human rights only occur when they are in agreement with other interests. Shortterm realist interests also reveal, in certain cases, that democracy promotion does not even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting democracy. China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, are sites where security and economic interests override the interest of supporting a democracy (Carothers 2007). Furthermore, lack of clarity and consistency in policies has wrongly entangled democracy promotion with military and security interests. Security, for any state, including the U.S. is critical to a state‘s survival. Indeed, first and foremost, security is America‘s primary interest. Michael McFaul notes that the ―central purpose of American power is not to make the world a better place, but first to ensure security, prosperity of American people‖ and the ―paramount objective of American foreign policy must always be to defend the security of the American people‖ (McFaul 2010, 10, 68). Deterring military foes, forging alliances, creating alliances, ensuring stable access to natural resources, creating and maintaining U.S. military bases, expanding trade and investment opportunities abroad all represent strategies to ensure American security and, therefore, generally precede other policies (United States 2010). However, security is not, nor should not, be the sole interest of U.S foreign policy. Foreign policy, must take other interests into account; clearly, ―Not all interests need to be vital to be worthy of American protection‖ (Haass 1995, 48). A. The Case for Wilsonianism A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion states a U.S. interest in upholding moral values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to human rights, and here democracy promotion is not simply a tool for national interest. Democracy promotion is seen as an end in itself that promotes human rights values, quality of life, economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America‘s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Critics have deemed this view to be limited in the scope with which it can substantiate a policy action to promote democracy. Richard Haassargues, ―The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford‖ (Haass 1995, 46). Further critiques note that there may still be instances where national security or economic interests override supporting democratic values. When it comes to human rights, nowhere have the conflicts and contradictions been greater than in Washington‘s dealings with superpowers. Haass continues, ―When it comes to relations with Russia or China, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, other national security interests must normally take precedence over (or at least coexist with) concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. During the early Bush administration certain neo-conservatives appropriated ―the fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass‖ as another means to highlight the apparent conflicting interests associated with democracy promotion (Haass 2005). B. The Case for Realism Realists emphasize the balance of U.S. power amongst other global actors through the maintenance of security. ―This theory prescribes that the U.S. has a security interest in increasing its military and economic power and fostering and maintaining alliances with powerful states to check the influence of other great or rising powers‖(McFaul 2010, 76). Above all else, maintaining a balance of power is ideal. U.S. needs access to oil, minerals, basing rights and trade from all countries willing to cooperate, irrespective of whether they are autocratic or democratic. Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces and generate both domestic and international instability. In the case of Egypt, for instance, supporters of Mubarak and Mubarak himself, argued that democratization could give way to the empowerment of non-western friendly actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region (Embassy Cairo 2010).Haass acknowledges ―The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm policy concerns‖ (Haass 1995, 48). C. Democracy Promotion as a Tool, Rather Than an End Here is where focus on short-term realist interests prompts a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. Under a realist school of thought, democracy promotion is seen as a tool rather than an end. It can be emphasized as a strategy to ideally secure other interests. Consequently, democracy promotion, when it exists, can become entangled with military and security interests; or, democracy promotion may not exist at all where other strategic interests are already present. Still, there are cases where democracy promotion doesn‘t even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting a democracy. U.S. military presence in the Middle East prompts the need for allies in the region. Pakistan represents one instance; Pervez Musharraf maintained control of Pakistan with his power as a military dictator up until the 2008 elections. Security interests as well as economic interests play a significant role in undermining democracy promotion in the Middle East. U.S. oil interests invoke a more hardheaded foreign policy that disregards human rights and quality of life standards in states such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Michael McFaul notes, ―Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the U.S. would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life‖ (McFaul 2010, 79). On the same note, other countries with limited trade and aid relations to the U.S., such as Syria, will not experience the same policy with the U.S. as does Saudi Arabia, for instance. Economic and strategic interests have, in the past, prevented the U.S. from taking a firm stance against China‘s human rights violations. China, on the contrary, maintains a favored nation status. For the U.S., ―promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to export to China and engage in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside‖ (Haass 1995, 53). Indeed U.S. leverage against China‘s human rights violations is supposedly limited due to economic interests that are present. Furthermore, when powers face a challenger to their hegemony, they are more likely to tolerate autocracies that can present themselves as buffer against their rivals (Levitsky and Steven and Way, 2002). The U.S. has been cited for supporting the ‗democrat‘ rather than the democracy where support for autocratic allies is emphasized over support for actual democratic institutions. This policy was seen in Egypt, prior to January 25, 2011, where the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid over the past several decades to prop up the Egyptian dictatorship. Supporters of this policy acknowledge the false assumption that elected parties will be in agreement with the U.S. and its foreign policy. They acknowledge that democratic elections could promote the rise of a fascist leader (Kopstein 2006, 89). Mubarak, has been cited frequently for human rights violations; detention, torture, refusal to register opposition political parties were all used by Mubarak as a means to constrain the scope of democracy and prevent a threat to his persistent rule (Untied States 2008). In Egypt, Mubarak profited from this Western concern that Islamists will win a fair election in the country. ―As evidence Mubarak can point to the parliamentary elections of 2005, when candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood captured a majority of the seats they contested‖ (United States 2008). Although the U.S. rarely placed pressure on Mubarak publicly, documents from WikiLeaks reveal U.S. pressure on Mubarak to democratize and to improve human rights. Nevertheless, ―U.S. pressure for democratization largely ended with the strong Muslim Brotherhood showing of 2005‖(United States 2008). Instances of supporting autocratic allies have happened frequently in U.S. foreign policy, and present a challenge to the consistency in rhetoric of foreign policy and democracy promotion in the future. D. Entanglement of Democracy Promotion with Military or Security Interests Inconsistency between rhetoric and action can also manifest itself when other U.S. interests, specifically military and security interests, become entangled with the act of promoting democracy. In the past decade, entanglement represents one of the greatest faults to American foreign policy and its association with democracy promotion consequently. Entanglement presented itself most distinctly within Bush‘s Freedom Agenda where military force became an instrument for democracy promotion and democracy promotion became associated with regime change. Here, McFaul comments that “During the Bush administration, the American armed forces assumed a leading role in fostering democratic change (McFaul 2010, 155). At times, the purpose for a military intervention can be disguised under the veil of democracy promotion. Or, similarly, democracy promotion becomes a façade to fulfill other interests, as was seen in Iraq. “The increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link‘), rendered the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration" (Durac and Cavatorta 2009, 9). A close association between military intervention and democracy promotion overshadows the more traditional and legitimate means for supporting democratic development in other countries. In Iraq, policy makers fell back on democracy when all other legitimate reasons to invade couldn‘t be summoned. In cases like this, the act of using democracy promotion as a façade renders U.S. democracy promotion misleading and unfounded. IV. Undermining U.S. Credibility and Image A. Accusations of Hypocrisy The determinedness with which the Bush administration tied democracy promotion rhetoric to aggressive War on Terror military actions had the opposite of its desired effect. The U.S. had hoped that its preemption policy might be more palatable if couched in values that are almost universally agreed upon, like freedom and democracy. President Bush‘s statement ―For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East‖ implies that the U.S.‘s involvement in the Middle East is consistently aimed at supporting democratic movements. However, the fact that security is a much more immediate concern in military conflicts meant that, in practice, democracy was not the primary consideration when it came to which governments to support and which to challenge. Egypt, for example, is a close U.S. ally and enjoyed generous military support throughout the freedom agenda years despite being decisively authoritarian. On the other hand, the U.S. refused to support Hamas although it was democratically elected by the Palestinian people. While both of these decisions make sense from a geopolitical/security perspective, they do not fit the democracy promotion agenda. When President Bush made universal statements about democracy promotion while at the same time supporting non-democracies and failing to support all functioning democracies for security reasons, the international community recognized the hypocrisy. B. Accusations of Hubris Another way in which U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric helped undermine our credibility and image abroad has been by declaring success, or at least marked progress, in places where democracy, if it exists at all, is not functioning enough to improve the quality of life of citizens. By calling these examples successful, the U.S. either looks disturbingly out of touch or too haughty to admit the shortcomings of its democracy promotion efforts. Iraq is an excellent example of this, as Frank Rich of the New York Times points out: ―Iraq‘s ‗example of freedom,‘‖ as President Bush referred to his project in nation building and democracy promotion, did not inspire other states in the Middle East to emulate it. If Iraq is an example of success, who indeed would volunteer to be the next patient of U.S. democracy promotion? There are many other examples stretching back before the Bush era of similarly willfully inaccurate statements. Thomas Carothers points to the Congo, Cambodia, and Soviet-free Afghanistan as cases where the U.S. stubbornly congratulated themselves on progress that, to the rest of the world, looked like tragedy. Setting unrealistic expectations for the results of democracy promotion, such as President Bush‘s ―long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world, ―are another form of this hubris (Bush 2005). These two types of misleading rhetoric create a very stark image of U.S. democracy promotion in the eyes of the rest of the world. The U.S. claims to stand behind democratic forces in all states, but does not follow through when more immediate strategic concerns are present. Actions claimed to be democracy promotion are implemented with military coercion and claimed as successes even if they fail to provide security or stability for the country‘s citizens, and, in the case of Iraq, actively destabilize a region. As a result, ―the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and without‖ (Bali and Rana, 2010). V. Implications for Diplomatic Effectiveness: Realism The preceding mistakes have resulted in ―Obama and his foreign-policy team edge[ing] away from the language of democracy promotion, which they fear that the Freedom Agenda has rendered toxic. (Taub 2009)‖ The new administration may feel the need to avoid Bush-era rhetoric that engendered so much criticism, but the associations of U.S. democracy promotion with aggressive militarism, hypocrisy, and arrogance will not disappear overnight. They must be replaced by a strong, realistic redefinition of what democracy promotion means to the U.S., when and how it will be practiced, and when it must take a backseat to other more immediate concerns. Once the U.S. rhetorically embraces realistic standards, it will be possible for policy and rhetoric to be consistent. This will present a reasonable face for U.S. democracy promotion, encouraging cooperation and discussion rather than avoidance or presumptive opposition. This is something U.S. policymakers should be concerned with for more substantive reasons than international popularity. Being seen as hypocritical and arrogant strengthens the case of foreign leaders seeking to oppose U.S. policy, both in international forums and bilateral relations. The U.S.‘s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives- be they economic, military, or geopolitical- is materially harmed by the perception that we have qualities undesirable in a working relationship. Unrealistic assessment of outcomes, inconsistency, unwillingness to recognize areas of weakness, and arrogance are all characteristics that do not invite support and cooperation. Indeed, McFaul asserts the Bush administration‘s rhetoric and policy in the Middle East were damaging to the U.S.‘s ability to realize foreign policy goals to the extent that they formed ―a serious impasse between the White House and all other international organizations, which subsequently tried to steer clear of associating with Bush policies, including his freedom agenda‖ (McFaul 2010, 218). It clearly follows that all U.S foreign policy goals are served by a positive and respected image abroad, because other states and international organizations are more willing to cooperate with policies when they have a positive image of U.S. goals and methods for achieving them. Certain aspects of democracy promotion have been identified as contributing to a negative image abroad:  Aggression/militarism  Unwarranted declarations of success/denial of mistakes  Inconsistency o Between rhetoric and action Between standards for various states Accordingly, attempts to foster a more positive, cooperative image should involve amending democracy promotion policy to be more:  Peaceful and non-coercive  Realistic o In assessments of progress and willingness to discuss/learn from mistakes o Rhetoric able to be achieved with action o Policies capable of being applied consistently across cases (flexible, humble) Incorporating these guidelines into a new coherent democracy promotion strategy will help the Obama administration avoid the backlash against Bush era mistakes. As previously mentioned Obama is already bringing his democracy promotion rhetoric down to a more realistic level, but he has not fully embraced all the changes necessary for a new effective era of democracy promotion. His administration‘s handling of the recent Egyptian protests is an indication of the need for clear, consistent rhetoric that can be employed in situations where democracy promotion and other interests conflict. This is already acknowledged in private. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt in 2008 admits that ―An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.‖ Yet instead of openly addressing this conflict in statements on Egypt‘s unfolding revolution, President Obama delivered ―ambiguous messages about an orderly transition‖ (Embassy Cairo 2008). More than two weeks into the protests, he issued a statement saying ―the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people‖ (Obama 2011). While this is certainly an improvement on former president Bush‘s coercive and idealistic rhetoric, it does not provide a clear policy on democracy promotion and its limitations. Inherent in the statement is a message of non-coercion, acknowledgement of the unpredictability of democratization efforts, and an unwillingness to burn bridges with current government authorities. All of these considerations should be stated publicly and result from a clearly defined U.S. policy on democracy promotion that commits to realistic goals and recognizes that other interests like regional security must play a role in immediate decisions without endangering the long-term process of democratization. A. Non-coercion: Separating Immediate Security Concerns from Democracy Promotion Efforts As later sections of this paper will discuss, successful democratization is a long-term process requiring diverse economic and civil society development. While it is possible to destabilize a dictatorial regime through military or economic coercion, removing one undemocratic government does not automatically- or even usually- usher a functioning democracy into power. Therefore coercion is rarely a useful tool in democracy promotion efforts. More frequently, as described earlier in the chapter, democracy promotion ends up being used as a justification for otherwise unpopular coercive actions. Iraq is the most recent and most blatant example of military coercion justified by democracy promotion rhetoric, but understood by most politicians to be a strategic attempt to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Cuba provides an excellent example of economic coercion in the name of democracy. If the sanctions imposed by the U.S. really were an attempt to force a democratic transition, the decades of unperturbed socialism since their implementation would have proven this method a failure. The fact that the embargo remains intact proves other strategic interests are at stake. If the U.S. can refrain from using democracy promotion rhetoric to justify coercive policies, foreign governments and citizens will be less likely to balk at the idea of allowing the U.S. influence in their country. Later sections of this paper will elaborate on strategies for peaceful and non-coercive democracy promotion. This should be a policy that the U.S. is firmly committed to. Not only does it adhere to a basic moral commitment to human rights, peace, and stability, as outlined previously, by showing respect for state sovereignty and international cooperation it will also increase the ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy goals through diplomatic channels. Matthew Longo agrees that ―Without question, military power is important, but it is not the only road forward. Nor is it always the best agent for change. The message of democracy-promotion abroad is not well-delivered from the opposite end of a gun‖ (Longo 2010). This is not a call for the U.S. to withdraw its foreign military presence or adopt a pacifist attitude; far from it. It simply urges that democracy promotion rhetoric not be used as a decoration to make military action more palatable. Security rhetoric can be militant, but for the sake of effectiveness in the international arena, democracy promotion rhetoric should be non-coercive. B. Achievable Rhetoric The second point, realistic assessment of progress in democracy promotion efforts, is crucial in order to achieve consistency between rhetoric and action. If the government makes grandiose statements about democracy promotion, as were common under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, it will be hard pressed to live up to them. Eliminating tyranny entirely is a noble goal, as is supporting all democratic movements worldwide, but the truth is that the U.S. government is in no position to actually do either of those things. It cannot achieve consistency between rhetoric and action if rhetoric is unrealistic. This is not to say that there is no place for lofty or inspiring language. On the contrary, it often plays an important role in motivating populations to organize for democratic change. What is essential is that lofty rhetoric not be confused with actual commitments to act or expected outcomes of an action. For example, instead of claiming a completely free and democratic Middle East to be the goal of a policy like the Freedom Agenda, U.S. politicians could state that all citizens of Middle Eastern states deserve to have their basic rights and freedoms protected by accountable, responsive governments. It is entirely possible to reinforce a commitment to human rights and quality of life for all people without making specific claims about the U.S.‘s own power to reshape the world as it sees fit. C. Realism Allows for Consistency In addition to rhetoric about goals and actions being realistic in scope, it must also be as consistent as possible with actual U.S. interests, policies, and actions. Clearly this is not possible in all areas of foreign policy, particularly security and intelligence, but for democracy promotion it is largely possible and in fact helpful in many ways. Cavatorta and Durac point out that often, ―rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires.‖ It is important not to confuse democracy promotion for its own sake with democracy promotion used as part of a strategy to make a state less hostile to U.S. interests, be they economic, military, or political. This distinction is important because, as previously stated, democracy promotion is a long-term and contextually sensitive project and is unlikely to succeed as part of a short-term effort to affect specific strategic variables. Thus, if democracy promotion is tied to such projects rhetorically, it will seem to have a low success rate and diminish our credibility. If, however, it is made clear that the U.S. is seeking a strategic outcome, for instance permission to build a military base in a foreign state, and democracy promotion is one of many tools being employed to towards this end, no unrealistic expectations are raised. In this case, the U.S. appears pragmatic rather than blindly optimistic. Being clear and realistic rhetorically about the desired short-term and long-term outcomes of policies will improve the image of the U.S. as an international actor and restore credibility to its democracy promotion efforts. When democracy promotion is indeed the priority of a given project, it will be more successful and contribute to a more admirable and diplomatically effective U.S. when mistakes are recognized, discussed in a cooperative forum, and amended for future projects. Democracy promotion, like any process, will stagnate if unsuccessful models are ignored and allowed to proliferate because of a desire to save face. It is time to stop ―using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any democratization paradigm‖ and earn back the respect of the democracy promotion community (Carothers 2007, 4). D. Realism Encourages Multilateral Cooperation A further benefit to realistic assessments of progress beyond image repair is the possibility for greater international cooperation on democracy promotion projects. Discussions among democracy promoters about the successes and challenges of particular cases will not only foster a sense of shared goals, but also allow for faster and more effective revisions of unsuccessful tactics. Multilateralism has many benefits that will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper, but most simply it will make us less vulnerable to accusations of arrogance. Exemplifying the willingness to cooperate and take criticism that we would like to see in other states will only bolster our credibility and effectiveness in the diplomatic arena. VI. Conclusion Improving the image of the U.S. abroad will increase its effectiveness in all aspects of foreign policy. Creating a clear, consistent democracy promotion policy that recognizes the need to compromise between immediate strategic interests and long-term democratization efforts is necessary to eliminate accusations of hubris and hypocrisy so common since the Bush Administration‘s Freedom Agenda. President Obama has made steps in the right direction, but has yet to present a cohesive, transparent democracy promotion policy to the public.

### cap

#### No root cause of war – focus on the particulars instead

Gat 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed, locked for decades in ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts; this conceptual confusion is untangled and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

#### Sustainable capitalism now

Economist 2012 (The Economist, February 16, 2012, “Blood, Gore and capitalism,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/02/sustainable-capitalism)

THESE are busy days for Al Gore. In late January, the former vice-president turned climate-change warrior took to the high seas, leading a luxury cruise-cum-fact-finding mission to Antarctica for a bunch of billionaires and policy wonks. They were to see for themselves the melting ice shelf and enjoy what remains of the spectacular views. Then, on February 15th, he was in New York to launch a manifesto (pdf) for what he calls “sustainable capitalism”. The manifesto is published by the non-profit arm of Generation Investment Management, a fund-management company Mr Gore launched in 2004 with David Blood, an ex-partner at Goldman Sachs. The company focuses on firms with what it calls sustainable business models. Unlike Mr Gore's seafaring adventures, which generated a lively blogging war between Mr Gore, shipmates such as Richard Branson, and their right-wing critics, the manifesto is unlikely to set anyone's pulse racing. Yet its very dullness is a virtue, for it reflects the practical lessons learnt from several years of trying to make a success of the investment business, where the devil lies very much in the boring detail. The big picture outlined by Messrs Blood and Gore is hardly novel. An obsession with short-term profits rather than sustainable long-term profits led to the apotheosis of unsustainable capitalism—the crash of September 2008—and the subsequent bail-out of the financial system (though in this case, a lack of environmental concern was the least of the unsustainability problems). Like many people, they had expected this crash to be a turning point, after which capitalism would be reorientated towards the long term. In the event, this did not happen. Indeed, says Mr Gore, the “conversation about sustainability has if anything gone backwards”. To help remedy this, the manifesto suggests several changes to the way the capitalist system works. (It does not go into detail about other farther-reaching reforms for which Mr Gore has long advocated, such as putting a price on carbon.) The sexiest of these, assuming securities law turns you on, is a proposal—already made elsewhere by organisations such as the Aspen Institute—for “loyalty shares” that pay out more to investors that have owned them continuously for at least three years. The average holding period for a share is now seven months, down from several years in the 1990s. Rewarding longer ownership would require a lot of new legislation, particularly to apply it to existing firms. Even among those who favour long-termism there is debate about whether longer ownership is necessarily the same as more effective ownership. Still, it is worth discussing. Lovers of accountancy may be taken more by two other proposals. One, which would probably need legislation though could conceivably be introduced without it by regulators such as America’s Securities and Exchange Commission, is to require all companies to publish “integrated reports” that would include details of their environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance alongside their financial returns. Making such reporting mandatory would be a big step, especially given opposition from the significant number of firms that say that the science of ESG reporting is too immature to be integrated with financial reports. A better approach, cited in the manifesto, may be South Africa's new requirement that firms either publish an integrated report or explain why not. That should stimulate lively debate in either case. The Blood and Gore manifesto also wants firms to have to account for assets that might become "stranded" —worth much less—in the event of policy changes such as the imposition of a price on carbon emissions or higher charges for the use of water. This, the pair contend, would reveal many companies to be in much worse shape than they now appear, given plausible scenarios for how policy in these areas might one day develop. This scenario-planning might seem like a lot of extra work about stuff that is only hypothetical, and thus a burdensome extra cost. But Mr Blood points out that many firms already apply a price of carbon internally,¶ for example when evaluating significant investments, as they increasingly think it likely that governments will impose one. So perhaps it isn't that much more work. A key issue is whether all this extra information and rewards for loyalty will result in demands for more sustainable performance from those who own companies. As well as calling for company bosses to be paid in ways that incentivise sustainable long-term performance, the manifesto rightly shines a critical light on the pay of fund managers employed by institutional shareholders such as pension funds. Often, these managers are paid for short-term financial results, even though the liabilities of those investors—all of our pensions, for instance—are mostly very long-term. This prompts the thought that institutional investors that incentivise short-term performance when their liabilities are long-term may be in breach of their fiduciary duty as managers of other people's money. Indeed, maybe this incentive mismatch could provide the basis for a lawsuit. Messrs Blood and Gore say they are intrigued by the possibilities for such litigation to drive change, though they are not inclined to bring it themselves. But they do want to see the definition of what it means to be a fiduciary expanded to include an emphasis on sustainable investing. To their critics, Messrs Blood and Gore simply want to weigh capitalism down with political correctness. Yet they insist that a focus on firms that deliver sustainable results is actually the best long-term investment strategy. That, after all, is why they created Generation. Unlike earlier "green" and "ethical" investment funds, which screened out "bad" companies, effectively sacrificing financial return for purity, Generation set out to outperform the market by finding firms that it expected to do better than average over the long term.

#### Tech solves

Huggins 2012 (Laura E. Huggins, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and director of development at PERC—the Property and Environment Research Center—a think tank in Bozeman, Montana, that focuses on market solutions to environmental problems, 2012 “A Doom Deferred” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/105756)

The authors of the Times op-ed also wrote that “the effects of overpopulation play a part in practically every daily report of mass human calamity.” Floods, for example, “inundate more homes as populations expand into floodplains. Such extreme events are stoked by climate change, fueled by increasing carbon emissions from an expanding global population.” These modern-day predictions are in stark contrast to claims in the same vein from the 1970s. In a popular 1970 speech at Swarthmore College, for example, well-known ecologist Kenneth Watt said, “If present trends continue, the world will be about four degrees colder for the global mean temperature in 1990, but 11 degrees colder in the year 2000. This is about twice what it would take to put us into an ice age.” Time has not been gentle with such prophecies. Four decades later, the world hasn’t come to an end. Most measures of human welfare show the Earth’s population is better off today than at any other time in human history. Life expectancy is increasing, per-capita income is rising, and the air we breathe and the water we drink are cleaner. And concerns about climate change have shifted from cooling to warming since the 1970s. Given past trends, we are right to deny doom-and-gloom claims such as this one in Harte and Ehrlich’s article: “Perpetual growth is the creed of a cancer cell, not a sustainable human society.” New ideas and technologies proliferate at a much faster rate than population. New ideas and technologies proliferate at a much faster rate than population. They depend on individuals who are free to pursue their own interests and innovate with few constraints. As Stanford economist Paul Romer put it, “Every generation has perceived the limits to growth that finite resources and undesirable side effects would pose if no new recipes or ideas were discovered. And every generation has underestimated the potential for finding new recipes and ideas. We consistently fail to grasp how many ideas remain to be discovered. Possibilities do not add up; they multiply.”

#### Cap most ethical—alt is extinction

Francois-Rene Rideau. (Phd. University of Nice). "Capitalsim is the Instituion of Ethics: A Speech prepared for the Libertarian International Convention." 2005. http://fare.tunes.org/liberty/sofia2005.html

I In a strong sense, Capitalism is Ethics: a paradigm of individual choice. Behaving according to the rules of Capitalism is being an ethical agent respectful of the ethical nature of oneself and other persons. Violating the rules of Capitalism is denying the ethical nature of oneself and other persons. 2 Ethics: a Paradigm of Individual Choice Let's start by examining the nature of Ethics. Ethics is the process of distinguishing between good and bad. Like any process, it is relevant only in as much as it affects human behaviour. And it affects human behaviour, because an individual, when confronted with many opportunities, and in as much as he's able to make the difference, will naturally be inclined to choose the opportunity that's best. Best according to him, that is. No, not best according to the criteria that he is ready to publicly admit he applies; best according to what he really thinks matters; this means best for himself first, though that self includes the persons and causes he identifies with. I therefore insist that Ethics is about Choice. Without a choice, good and bad have no relevant meaning. And within a choice, it's actually the comparison ``better´´ and ``worse´´ between opportunities that matters, it isn't an absolute ``good´´ outside of context. I insist on Individual Choice: every decision is necessarily made by an individual person. Any so-called ``collective´´ phenomenon is the emerging result of individual actions; there are no social forces that act outside and above of individuals; every decision or action that may or may not participate of a collective phenomenon is actually made by a single individual [2]. I also insist on the subjective nature of ethical judgments: moral judgements are necessarily based upon individual criteria, due to personal knowledge and subjective preferences [3]. Enjoyment is individual, and so is suffering individual. All preferences are individual: good is good for someone, or more precisely according to someone. And good or bad only directly matters if it's good or bad for the extended self of the individual making the decision. There is no good without someone to benefit: there is no possible ``collective good´´ that benefits a murky ``collective´´ unless it's a good that benefits all the members of said collective. A ``collective´´ judgment may objectively compare preferences and results over each individuals; in some cases, it may then conclude that everyone is better off in some situation than in some other. Hence the concept of Pareto optimality, but more importantly, hence the principle that mutually voluntary exchanges benefit all involved parties. On the other hand, there is no objective way to reconcile conflicts when someone loses and someone else wins; there is no objective common scale on which to project individual preferences and deduce a collective aggregate value [4]. 3 Responsibility: The Dynamic Feedback of Ethics Up to now, we have seen that Ethics is a paradigm of individual choice. According to what rules will individuals make decisions? How may we acquire correct rules of behaviour that benefit us, rather than incorrect rules of behaviour that actually harm us? What can make our ethical theories to actually be good? In cybernetical terms, we speak of the structural coupling between two structures. The two structures concerned are the real world and each of our mental models of it. What ensures the relevance of our models and its ethical rules with respect to the real world and the laws of nature, so that our decisions actually benefit us? As always, the answer, in cybernetical terms, is feedback. You may have heard of experiments where a man is cut from his sensorial feedback, eyes and ears shut, plunged into a bath at body temperature, with artificial breathing and feeding. After a long enough time in such a situation, the man goes crazy. His mind has been disconnected from reality. Cut a man from his sensorial feedback, and after some time, he'll go raving mad, without sensorial direction. Well, the same is true for man as moral being: cut him from his moral feedback, and after some time, he'll behave in a morally crazy way, without moral compass. In the realm of morality, the feedback is named responsibility. Responsibility is when someone suffers the consequences of some decisions. And this means both the positive consequences and the negative consequences. When responsibility coincides with liberty, when the person who takes some decision suffers the full consequences of these decisions, then there is a feedback loop; then people benefit from their good choices and lose from their bad choices; and so they may learn from experience. As you may know, experience is the best teacher; but it is an expensive teacher, that always gives the lesson after it gives the examination. However, intelligent people learn from other people's experience, not just their own — so they may learn the lesson and succeed at future examinations without having to fail at first. When it matches liberty of choice, responsibility before the consequences of one's own choice is the one principle of progress in human history. It is the feedback from reality that makes us stick to reality and improve ourselves within it. Responsibility is what keeps human action relevant to human fate. Without responsibility, we lose track of how to behave; worse, with misplaced responsibility, where those who decide are not those who suffer the consequences of decisions, then we get on the wrong track, and we run into disasters. To avoid confusion, note the distinction between (1) responsibility in fact, that falls upon whoever actually suffers the consequences of action, (2) the feeling of responsibility, that some people may or may not have, whether or not they actually suffer the direct consequences of given actions. It is through the feeling of responsibility that some people may adjust their actions; but it is actual responsibility that creates a dynamics whereby people learn to feel the right kind of responsibility rather than a wrong one. We may also distinguish (3) responsibility in law, which is about the praise or blame that people get, but I'll get to that later. Some people may try to equate Responsibility in Fact with some kind of immanent justice. However, it must be understood that conscious human action is part of the feedback that constitutes Responsibility. If humans don't consciously create feedback, then responsibility may fail to exist. In other words, in this matter as in others, We can't ``let nature decide´´ — we are part of nature; we can't ``let god enforce his will´´ — we are among god's agents; we can't ``let authority tell us´´ — we are the makers of the authority that determines things; it isn't above us, it is us. And we'll see that this is what Law is about. To summarize what Ethics is, Ethics is a paradigm of individual choice between opportunities, which choices are kept relevant to the meaning of human life through the feedback of responsibility. That is why Capitalism is precisely the Institution of Ethics: Capitalism is the formal recognition of Human Action as a Paradigm of Individual Choice between Opportunities. 4 Capitalism: the Institution of Ethics Indeed, what is Capitalism? Capitalism is a Theory of Law. It is a Theory of Law that consists in the definition of individual property rights. A Theory of Law gives means to resolve and prevent conflicts. Conflicts arise when individuals make incompatible decisions about some resources that may be used in only one of the proposed ways at most. Capitalism is a Theory of Law based upon the recognition that human action is made of individual decisions, that are kept relevant through responsibility. Because a resource may be spent but by individual decision, whoever ultimately gets to decide the use or fate of a resource in fact possesses that resource. The only way to prevent future conflicts about resources is thus to determine whose decision is to prevail about said resources, who may legitimately possess it. Capitalism is thus based upon acknowledging to each potentially disputed resource a proprietor, an owner. The owner may decide how this resource is preserved or spent. But under Capitalism, the way that ownership of resources is distributed is not arbitrary. Capitalism recognizes that possession in fact [5], without any previous conflicting claim from anyone else, makes for valid property rights [6]. Hence, the personal liberties by which each individual owns his own body, mind, and activity. Hence also the homesteading rule by which individuals appropriate natural resources by being the first to put them to actual use. Capitalism also recognizes the necessity of responsibility. Thus, it seeks to match the liberty of making a decision with the responsibility for the consequences of making said decision. Hence, creators get to own whatever they create, whether it's good or bad. Hence, destroyers get to be responsible for what they destroy, whether it's good or bad. If during a transformation, one both creates and destroys things, one gets both the praise and the blame accordingly. And blame means that the culprit must compensate the victim for encroachment to the victim's property. Finally, Capitalism recognizes the goodness of mutually volontary exchanges. Hence, not only is a property individual: all decisions concerning it are ultimately borne by a one person, the owner. A property is also transferable: the owner may give or exchange his property with any other willing individual, at mutually agreed conditions. Finally, a property is divisible: either through physical division, time sharing or any agreed upon arrangement, the owner may split his property so as to exchange part of it with another individual, through contract. These are the principles of Capitalism. 5 Law and Facts But what relationship does Capitalism have to reality? Indeed, what does any Theory of Law have to do with reality? What binds Fact to Law? The choice between actions, good and bad, legitimate or illegitimate, still resides upon individual choice. Just because some action has been identified as legitimate or illegitimate doesn't magically drive individuals towards or away from this action. Once again, there is one distinction that may drive an individual's behaviour, when said individual is able to make this distinction: it is the distinction between what is good for said person and what is bad for said person. But unless you can somehow tie legitimacy to individual good, then it remains an irrelevant distinction as far as human action goes. That's where the domain of Law comes into play. Widely held opinions about what is legitimate, bind individual interest, through the implementation and expectation of enforcement. Because people expect punishment for their deeds that are generally found to be bad, they will refrain from indulging such deeds — or suffer the wrath of society, and eventually be removed from society, should they persist. Ideas have consequences. Ideas about legitimacy have consequences in terms of what rules of behaviour people adopt. Law is part of what makes fact. A wide feeling of legitimacy breeds force. Right makes Might. Certainly, force gives means to do massive propaganda so as to cultivate a feeling of legitimacy. Might gives the means to make Right. And it has to, if it is to survive without yielding to a revolt. That is why, for instance, you mustn't imagine slaves as being on the constant brink of revolt. Those who could revolt did so before they were conquered, and died; thereafter the few who revolt are destroyed before the majority rises. And so the vast majority of living slaves find that their fate, if not deserved, is by all means normal, a necessary burden in the natural order of society. And I mean not only slaves, but all oppressed people, by all kinds of oppression, including whichever you can observe around you. But this is also why you shouldn't confuse Law, as the mighty ones want it to be, Law, as their lawyers write it, Law, as their uniform-wearing thugs enforce it, and Law, as established by the population at large, whether through official or unofficial means. 6 The Enforcement of Property Rights If Law in general gets its power from enforcement, how are property rights to be enforced within Capitalism? Well, under a system of Capitalism, the owner of some resource may defend his property against trespassers, intruders, robbers; and the owner of destroyed or altered property may require tort reparation from intentional or unintentional borrowers, thieves, vandals, destroyers. Defense and reparation of property may require the use of force; the enforcement of property rights thus imply a sphere for the legitimate use of force. Now, force itself requires the use of resources; thus, the paradigm of property rights implies that the owners of said resources be responsible for deciding whether and how to use resources for property enforcement. Under a regime of property rights, property owners will spend the resources they desire to defend the properties they consider deserve a defense; they may start with defending their own property, and that of those they care for; but they may also help prevent and prosecute any property encroachment that is repugnant to them, whoever the victim may be. And they may organize in the most efficient ways they find, on a free market. A monopoly on the use of force, taking some resources by force from people to organize defense, and forbidding them to use other resources to defend themselves, is thus in itself a violation of property rights. A monopolist Government, a State, is thus a negation of Capitalism, and actually the biggest negation there is of Capitalism. 7 Capitalism as a Phenomenon Now, you'll tell me, such unrestricted Capitalism doesn't exist — at least yet. Its opponents call it ``wild´´ capitalism, the law of the jungle. But it doesn't exist because it's actually much more civilized than our societies currently are. Whatever the case may be, in absence of such complete Capitalism, universally recognized as valid Law, what is the relevance of Capitalism in society? That's where I would like to say a few things about Capitalism as a phenomenon. Capitalism is a word coined by Marx. I don't mean the great philosopher, Groucho Marx, I mean the bad humorist, Karl Marx. Marx defined ``Capitalism´´ as the private ownership of means of production, as opposed to government ownership of those means of production in the name of the ``collective´´. He actually made up the term from the word ``capitalist´´, which designates someone who earns his living out of the proceeds of his capital investments. What is capital? Capital is any resource that has to be reserved in advance, so that production may take place that will only bear fruits later. It includes any tools and machinery, but also the resources needed to sustain the lives of the workers until production is successful — assuming it is successful, eventually. If we are to understand capital as productive material machinery, then the first capitalist man was the first tool owner, the first person to foresee the future utility of a tool and keep that solid stick or hard stone for a future use. The first capitalist was the first human, the first homo abilis. What distinguishes man from animal is precisely this ability to use, keep and develop tools. And capitalism is humanity. Everyone is a capitalist in as much as one owns anything that is for use at a latter date. But those who distinguish as are more capitalist than others, are those who see further than other people, and keeps things for future use that other people fail to prepare or neglect to keep. If capital is to be understood in a broader sense, as any material thing that one may possess, that will enable future production, then first capitalist was the first animal to keep food for next year, or even for next day. And if these possessions are to include absorbed chemicals as well as chemicals stored outside one's body, then the first capitalist was the first living cell, that kept chemicals inside a membrane. Capitalism, as a phenomenon, is life itself. Those who fight Capitalism, the phenomenon, are actually seeking to destroy mankind, they are seeking to destroy life itself. They want to put an end to civilization and return to brutish animality. They want to put an end to animality and return to vegetation. They want to put an end to vegetation, to change, to life itself, and return to the purity and stability of death.

#### Util is good and doesn’t devalue life

Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This